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Abstract: Supply chain cybersecurity in critical
infrastructure is commonly framed as a third-party risk management problem
addressed through vendor assessments, contractual controls, and compliance
checklists. While these mechanisms provide necessary baseline assurance, they
are insufficient to detect and mitigate systemic cyber risk in highly
interdependent infrastructure ecosystems. In sectors such as healthcare and
energy, cybersecurity risk increasingly emerges from the structure of
interdependencies among internal organizational units, shared digital services,
and tightly coupled supplier relationships rather than from isolated vendor
weaknesses. This conceptual article reframes supply chain cybersecurity as an
emergent system property shaped by dependency topology, coupling strength, and
governance alignment. Drawing on systems theory, interdependence, and cascading
failure concepts, the paper explains why transactional, vendor-centric
approaches routinely underestimate exposure and fail to anticipate propagation
pathways. A systems-informed governance perspective is proposed to support
executive oversight, resilience planning, and policy development in critical
infrastructure supply chains. The contribution advances theoretical
understanding while offering a practical governance lens for leaders seeking to
reduce cascading cyber risk across complex socio-technical ecosystems. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.51505/ijaemr.2026.11209 |
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